The holding of early parliamentary elections in Togo on October 14, 2007, most likely the first free and fair Togolese elections since decades, are considered internationally as a litmus test of despotic African regimes' propensity to change towards democratization and economic prosperity. Western donors took Togo as model to test their approach of political conditionality of aid, which had been emphasised as corner stone of the joint EU-Africa strategy. Recent empirical findings on the linkage between democratization and economic performance are challenged in this paper. It is open to question, whether Togo's expected economic consolidation and growth will be due to democratization of its institutions or to the improved external environment, notably the growing competition between global players for African natural resources.
Introduction
When the longest-serving African dictator, Togo's Gnassingbé Eyadéma, died October 2007, which would be the first after decades of autocratic rule. This is also expected by many observers to bring to an end 15 years of economic hardship, caused by the political crisis and ruthless repression of political opponents as well as by international isolation of the country, including the disengagement by major donors in view of the 'democratization deficit ' since 1993. 4 In the following sub-chapters I shall analyse the political background of these presidential elections in Togo, against the long history of political repression in this country, which was renowned up to the end of the 1980s for its prosperity, and often labelled the Swiss of Africa. A discussion of Togo's failed democratization and its impact on economic performance, including its aftermath for the poorest sections of the country will be followed by a summary of lessons learned. An outlook of the prospects for democratic renewal and economic consolidation, starting with the coming parliamentary elections of October 2007 will conclude the chapter.
Background
The history of independent Togo is a show case of the unholy alliance of misguided post-colonial Africa policy and the quest of African autocrats for unlimited personal power. The murder of the first President of the newly independent Togo, Sylvanus Olympio, on January 13, 1963, by a group of Togolese veterans of the French colonial army, led by sergeant Etienne Gnassingbé (later called Eyadéma) and tolerated, if not instigated by the former French colonial power, opened up a Pandora's box (cf. Toulabor 1986; Decalo 1987; Cornevin 1988; Although Togo was often labelled euphemistically up to the end of the 1980s the ' Swiss of Africa', Eyadémas', economic policy was neither development oriented nor aiming at pro-poor growth. Nevertheless, Togo gained relative prosperity up to the early 1980s because of its role as transit-economy for neighbouring countries. Not only for land-locked Sahel-countries like Burkina Faso or Niger, but also for Ghana, subdued by a severe economic crisis, and last but not least for Nigeria which followed an importsubstitution policy. Therefore, the effective demand for consumer goods which could not be satisfied on the markets of Accra or Lagos, was redirected to the informal market networks at Lomé. The economic decline of the country, reinforced by growing political repression, started already about 1985 and continued up to date. Most Togolese citizens of today are poorer than twenty years ago (cf. WB 1996; Lejeal/Agbessi 2004 :2332 ).
Eyadéma's despotism was based on three pillars: First, an army (Forces Armées Togolaises, FAT), organized like a Praetorian guard, as well as security services and pro-Eyadéma militias, dominated by members of the ethnic group of the president (Kabiyè). In 1991, for the first time ever, detailed data on the army were published during the hearings of the National Conference. They show that officers and troops belonged overwhelmingly to the Kabiyè, six of the officers were even from Pya, the home village of Eyadéma (nearby the Provincial capital Kara, the headquarters of the Gnassingbé-clan), one of the reasons why the army was nicknamed in public as 'army of cousins ' (cf. Toulabour 2005) . The military was systematically upgraded with foreign assistance, notably of France, within the framework of secret pacts of mutual assistance.
In the reconstruction period, following the murder of Sylvanus Olympia (1963-67), Togo's military expenditure topped the list of all African states, and still in 1991 it counted -per capita -among the largest armies of the world. Ethnic instrumentalization of the army and security services and the militarisation of key-positions in the economy did not stop with mounting critic of international donors since 1993. Quite to the contrary, Eyadéma promoted again four 'nordistes' to the rank of brigadiers in 1998, other high ranking pro-Eyadéma officers were promoted to key positions in the administration, including parastatals. Nevertheless, the army was no homogenous block, as the social and political differentiation between rank and file, between 'nordistes' and and bad government of the Eyadéma Regime, was not as radical as might be supposed in view of official declarations on aid conditionality. Even Bonn, which increasingly fell apart with Paris over continuing aid to Lomé, paid between 1998 and 2003 between € 8 and 10 Mio. of bilateral aid to Togo. not stop short of accusing political dissidents from Eyadéma's own ethnic Kabiyè (Kabre) group or his own extended family 4 . The informal rule of traditional chiefs was adapted to the needs of despotism by the politics of 'authenticity', i.e. the reference to (re-invented) traditional rules, and by the forced 'alignment' of chiefs in the National Confederation of traditional rulers of Togo (L'Union Nationale des Chefs Traditionnels du Togo, UNCTT) created in August 1969 (cf. Decalo 1996) . Thus, still in 1997 the official website of the Togolese government propagated a very special meaning of 3 An example of political instrumentalized xenophobia concerns the politics of ‚Togolité', as codified by the revision of the constitution of 2002. Thereby, exiled opponents and refugees were treated as 'foreigners', who could not any more qualify for public offices. Another example is the differentiation between 'authentic', 'original', or 'true' Togolese, propagated by government media vis à vis the so called 'Southern immigrants', i. e. the Ewé ethnic group, which immigrated centuries ago from neighbouring Ghana; many of its members belonged to the opposition, and were therefore labelled 'stateless vagabonds' or 'traitors' (cf. Toulabour 2003) . Already in the 1970s the government in Lomé blamed the so-called 'Brazilians', i.e. Togolese of Latin American-African descent, notably the descendants of returned ex-slaves and slave dealers from Brazil, like the wealthy families of Da Zouza, Olympio or d'Almeida, and re-immigrants from Sierra Leone or Nigeria, like the Lawsons, living in Southern Togo, of preparing a coup (cf. Decalo 1996:50, 73-74) . 4 Interestingly enough, there existed at least four Togolese concentration camps for political detainees, situated near Kazaboua, Agombio, Mandouri and Otadi in the northern parts of the country. Kazaboua, at the outskirts of the village of Kaza, about 12 km from Kazaboua, was notorious because of the imprisonment of so-called 'witches', where also political dissidents accused of occult practices, were imprisoned, tortured or murdered. It was constructed under dubious circumstances with assistance of a pioneer unit of the German army, under the cover of bilateral military co-operation and armament grant in the early 1980s (cf. Kohnert 1997: 43; Codjie, 1991) .
A deep and rewarding insight into the occult aspects of informal politics in Africa, taking the (veiled) example of Eyadéma, offers the satiric novel of the late Ivorian writer Ahmadou Kourouma, (2003) "Waiting for wild beasts to vote", ('En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages'). Although presented in form of fiction, it is based on painstaking research of the author into the fabric of informal politics in Togo and other francophone countries of sub-Saharan Africa, putting the pertinent questions by means of an African praise singer (griot); cf. the detailed book reviews of this oeuvre by C. Toulabor and others, 7 African democracy: "En démocratie africaine, tout est négociable, sauf le chef!" 
Election results
On June 3 the Constitutional Court in Lomé, dominated by Eyadéma-followers, which had already given their blessing for the doubtful constitutional revisions of the past and who were known for their biased statements from foregoing elections, confirmed the official election results reported by the CENI: they accorded 60,1% of votes for the incumbent, and 38,3% for the major opposition candidate Bob Akitani; the official acknowledged number of registered voters was 3,599,306, and voter turnout 2,288,279 or 63,6% (invalid votes: 88,005, cf. table 1). Just one day later Faure Gnassingbé was sworn in as new president. His occult initiation was effected secretly already before in Kara, the fief of the Gnassingbé family, to honour the tradition of occult politics of the father.
However, calculations of the opposition and of independent international NGOs, which had followed up the voting process by its own monitoring system, revealed a completely different result. According to extrapolations by the French NGO Survie France, the candidate Akitani won the election with 72%, against 26% for his adversary, even if one would consider only part of electoral cheating committed by pro- 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 For the dependents of the some 60,000 thousand political refugees, only reluctantly returning from neighbouring in 2006, i.e. the elderly, women and children left behind, life became even more difficult. Still five month after the violent electoral conflicts, many homes and property destroyed still lacked repair, there was no money to pay the school fees, and prices for maize, the major staple crops of the poor, rocketed in
July because of lack of supply for local markets, apparently there was considerable trafficking of food stuffs to neighbouring drought-ridden Sahelian countries, but also to Ghana and Gabun, where wholesalers could earn larger profits. 
Theoretical implications: failed democratization is worse than no democratization
According to recent literature on the linkage of democratization on growth in SubSaharan Africa, the emergent democratic institutions have had a negligible direct effect on economic growth 9 . The case study on Togo presented, would confirm this hypothesis at first sight. Yet, it will be challenged out of methodological reasons. , available data on economic development, income distribution or growth are highly unreliable. Therefore, systematic quantitative analyses of the linkage between democratization and economic performance or well-being of the people lack the required robust empirical data base to arrive at reliable results. In countries dominated by informal institutions, where more than half of economic activities are unrecorded (55% in the case of Togo), hidden by the 10 In the 1990s, the informal economic sector contributed on average 41% to the non-agricultural GDP in sub-Saharan Africa (Benin: 41% (1993); Ghana: 58% (1988); Togo: 55% (1995)), and 29% in Latin America, according to estimates of the ILO (ILO 2002:24) . According to Chen et al (2004) , about 72% of total employed outside the agricultural sector were employed in the informal sector in SSA (51% in Latin America).
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shadow economy of the informal sector, the variance of many relevant variables due to (unknown) data errors can be -and most probably often is -more important than the variance due to the anticipated influence of other variables 11 . Heroic assumptions that the variance of the unrecorded data would be similar to that of registered data (and therefore negligible) is based on little evidence. Quite to the contrary, there are strong indicators that there exist significant, sometimes even antagonistic differences between the political and economic performance of actors involved in the informal sector, according their resource endowment and class position (cf. Kohnert 2007b) . This applies even to the most basic economic data, like the per capita income.
As long as more reliable data on the informal sector are not available, research on these topics should focus on in-depth case-studies and holistic qualitative analyses with 'thick description' (C. Geertz) instead of sophisticated but unviable large-n econometric cross-country or panel analyses. Besides, one should take into account the age old controversial debate in economics, on the impact of political regimes and governance on economic growth, which is characterized by a deep divide between different schools of thought up to date. Correspondingly, differing results of analyses on the linkage between democratization and development in low income countries reflect in many cases rather the ideological stance of the author than the reality, notably if applied to African conditions. Because of the high volatility of African LDCs to external shocks and the predominance of external political and economic conditions on domestic growth, a possible positive impact of democratization on economic prosperity may be overlaid or counteracted by a change in these external conditions. The doubtful reputation of Togo as 'Switzerland of Africa' under the dictatorship of Eyadéma mentioned above may serve as example.
In addition, one has to take due account of the possible trade off between general growth, accompanied by increased income inequality, and pro-poor growth.
This trade off is likely to occur in cases of high power concentration, the hegemony of 11 Some authors tend to assume that informal social capital and formal organizations interact in ways that have rather positive outcomes, e.g. that innovative informal networks are the base for creating true democratic formal institutions of civil society (cf. Rose 1997, n. p; World Bank 2001:171) . This might be true in some cases, but the opposite is true as well, informal networks can be anti democratic, insofar as they are used to corrupt formal institutions, the role of West African's so-called 'traditional' secret national power elites, and pronounced income inequality (cf. McKay et al 2004; Nel 2005) . That is, it is likely to occur in Togo too, if not prevented by a rigorous supervision of a sustainable pro-poor policy within the framework of IMF sponsored PRSP-programmes (cf. IMF 2007) . Finally, growth is not the only solution: In some African countries, notably in those with high inequality, like the former 'settler economies' of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, even small changes in income distribution, enforceable politically without civic conflict, could have a significant larger poverty reducing impact than growth (cf. Bigsten/Shimeles (2007) . Besides, it is likely to have positive effects on democratic transition. But the merits of democratization on growth (and vice versa) will be seen only in the long run (cf.
Papaioannou & Siourounis 2005).

Conclusion
In summary, the particular conditions of Togo's development over the past three decades do not confirm any close relationship between the form and methods of governance and the economic well-being of the people. Certainly, other things being equal, the repression by the corrupt Eyadéma-Regime has had strong negative effects on the majority of the opposition which suffered increasing hardship over decades, notably because of the enduring political crisis in the aftermath of the abortive democratic transition, initiated by the National Conference of 1991. To be clear about it, the Eyadéma-Regimes was never a development oriented dictatorship like that of Singapore or Uganda. The relative economic success of Togo in the 1970s and 1980s, was due to favourable external conditions, both in international politics (Cold War bias of development cooperation) and international economics (Togo's role as transit economy) as explained above. Even more than a decade of aid conditionality and disengagement of major donors (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , failed to bring the desired results. In view of Togo's hegemonic power structure, it mostly affected the opposition and the poorer sections of the population. Only if the international donor community is ready to learn from its past errors and willing to take responsibility for it, a sustainable democratic transition can societies like the Okija-cult of the Igbo, the Yoruba 'Ogboni Society' in Nigeria (cf. Kohnert 2007a), or the Mafia in Southern Italy or Russia are outstanding examples.
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succeed. This requires first of all continuing close supervision of the process by the EU, i.e. substantial security, organizational and financial intervention for the support of the democratic forces of Togo to guarantee fair and free elections. Afterwards a long-term reconstruction assistance is indispensable.
